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Artikel ini membahas secara hipotetik pengaruh implemetasi Undang-undang 
(UU) No. 17/2000 tentang pajak penghasilan terhadap perilaku para pembayar zakat di 
Indonesia. Artikel ini memberikan penjelasan bahwa perumus kebijakan tidak 
mendasarkan pengurangan pajak penghasilan yang disebabkan seseorang membayar 
zakat atas argumen bahwa baik pembayar zakat (muzakki) dan bukan pembayar zakat 
(non-muzakki) yang memiliki penghasilan yang sama memiliki marginal utility of income 
yang juga sama. Akibatnya, sekalipun terjadi pengurangan atas jumlah nominal pajak 
penghasilan yang dibayarkan seorang  muzakki, pengurangan tersebut tidak signifikan. 
Lebih jauh lagi, pengurangan tersebut tidak dapat dianggap sebagai upaya yang cukup 
dalam mencapai  equity antra seorang  muzakki dan  non-muzakki yang sama-sama 
membayar pajak penghasilan. 
 
Artikel ini juga membahas secara teoritis pengaruh implementasi UU No. 17/2000 
terhadap perilaku dari tiga kategori individu: (i) individu yang bersedia membayar zakat 
dengan alasan ibadah dan sekaligus seorang pembayar pajak yang baik, (ii) individu yang 
bersedia membayar zakat dengan alasan ibadah tetapi bukan pembayar pajak yang baik, 
dan (iii) individu yang hanya berupaya memaksimalkan pendapatan. 
 
Hasil telaah teoritis menunjukkan bahwa implementasi UU No. 17/2000 masih 
perlu penyempurnaan agar dapat mencapai hasil yang optimal. Hasil implementasi UU 
ini juga masih tidak dapat diukur karena keterbatasan data. Tampaknya, keberhasilan UU 
No. 17/2000 perlu ditunjang oleh upaya-upaya lain seperti upaya sentralisasi 
pengumpulan zakat, upaya peningkatan profesionalisme amil zakat, dan skema reward 
and punishment yang jelas. 
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Introduction 
 
Many Muslims living in Muslim countries in the world are still struggling to 
achieve a better quality of life. Most Muslim countries are still facing poverty and 
unequal distribution of income as well as other economic and social problems. These 
problems are also being tackled by Indonesia, which has the largest Muslim population in 
the world. 
 
In fact, Islam as the religion that is embraced by most people in Muslim countries, 
including Indonesia, has offered solutions to alleviate poverty and to lessen the income 
distribution gap.  As a part of the solutions, Islamic teaching recommends or even obliges 
Muslims to help the poor. There are a number of types of tithe/alms either voluntary or 




the obligatory alms are known as zakat.
4  Not all Muslims have to pay zakat, however. 
Only those who have qualified or met a certain wealth condition (called nishab) are 
obliged. Furthermore, the recipient group of zakat is well defined, and the needy are at 
the top of the list.
5 
 
Recently, the Indonesian government has been trying to regulate  zakat 
management policy. Two acts related to zakat are being implemented. The first one is the 
Law Number 38/1999 on the subject of zakat management, and the second one is the Law 
Number 17/2000 on Personal Income Tax. According to the latter, starting fiscal year 
2001, the zakat payers (muzakkis) may apply for a deduction in their personal income tax 
paid, due to the payment of their income zakat (Fatima, 2002).   
 
 
This regulation is clearly in favor of good Muslims who always pay zakat every 
year who are also decent tax payers at the same time. Consequently, by implementing this 
Law, the government would expect to have  a decrease in government revenue from 
personal income tax and to have an increase in the collection of zakat.
6  
                                                 
1 A voluntary service (or “kindness”) that is given by a Muslim to another person. Sadaqat does not have to 
be materialistic. In Islamic teaching, smiling to other person is also a sadaqat. 
2 A type of charity from a Muslim to needy or poor people, or the Masjid (Mosque), usually given in the 
form of money. 
3 Charity that is given to the Masjid or the Muslim society, but in the form of land or building (properties). 
4 There are two types of zakat in Islam, the zakat fitr (zakat that has to be paid only on Idul Fitri day) and 
the zakat mal (wealth or income zakat that has to be paid regularly/annually).  In this paper, however, only 
income zakat that is being taken into discussion, which is 2.5% from Income. 
5 See Mannan (1986) for the detailed discussion of zakat , or Ariff (1991),  for the description of zakat in 
some Asia countries. 
6 Actually, the government does not have a sub-ordinate in either Department of Religion Affairs or 
Department of Finance regarding zakat. Instead, the government establishes BAZIS (Zakat, Infaq, and 
Sadaqah Management Board) in all provincial level of the government. In the national level there is 
BAZNAS (National  Zakat Management Board). Nevertheless, in practice,  muzakkis often pay the zakat 
directly to the mustahiq (eligible recipient) that could be their relatives, or through Masjid committee in 
their local areas. It is ambiguous whether the committee would then transfer the zakat collected to BAZIS   3 
 
Despite the acceptance of zakat by good Muslim tax payers, income zakat could 
be viewed as a “new tax” to some tax payers. Pelzmann (in Kirchler, 1997) states that the 
imposition of a new tax is associated with a loss of individual freedom to dispose of one’s 
own money the way one wishes. However, Kirchler (1997) believes that the negative 
response of the new tax is likely to vary with “personal affectedness and personal norm 
dependency and subjective values such as self-serving versus community orientation” 
(Kirchler, 1997, page 423).  
 
This paper will discuss further about the effect of the Law Number 17/2000 on the 
behavior of the personal income tax and zakat payer in Indonesia. Firstly, it will show the 
calculation of the deduction of personal income tax by paying zakat according to the Law 
Number 17/2000. Then, this paper will show how the Law Number 17/2000 changes the 
allocation of resources, and whether the change can be justified using Pareto criterion. 
Moreover, this paper will attempt to answer whether the application of the law tend to 
support the government’s program in alleviating poverty or in lessening the income 
distribution gap between the rich and the poor, and hence may improve the net welfare of 
the people and could solve the problem of income inequality. The conclusion of the 
analysis will be given in the last section. 
Deducting Personal Income Tax by Paying Zakat 
 
According to the Law Number 17/2000, zakat can reduce the amount of personal 
income tax paid by a tax payer, as long as the  muzakki  pays the  zakat only to the 
legitimate zakat management board. Fatima (2002) shows some accounting calculations 
about how to reduce personal income tax due to the payment of zakat.  
 
The deduction is actually done by setting the “base” for calculating personal 
income tax payment on “after  –  zakat” income. Fatima (2002) believes that this is 
important to reach equity between the muzakkis and non-muzakkis who pay both income 
tax and zakat transfers to the government, and ultimately to the society.  
 
As an example, a muzakki earns gross income (per year) Rp 20,000,000 and net 
income Rp 10,000,000. Before the implementation of the Law Number 17/2000, she has 
to pay 10% income tax from her net income (equals Rp 1,000.000) to the government, 
plus 2.5% zakat from her gross income (equals Rp 500,000) either to mustahiqs (eligible 
zakat recipients) or to zakat collectors. Hence, in total, she has to pay Rp 1,500,000 for 
both transfers, while a non-muzakki only pays Rp 1,000,000. 
 
After the implementation of the law, if she has already paid zakat 2.5% from her 
gross income (Rp 500,000), then she has to pay income tax 10% X “after zakat income” 
(net income minus zakat = Rp 10,000,000 – Rp 500,000 = Rp 9,500,000), which equals 
Rp 950,000.  So, in total she has to pay Rp 1,450,000. Hence, the difference is “only” Rp 
1,500,000 minus Rp 1,450,000, which is equal Rp 50,000.  
                                                                                                                                                 
and then to BAZNAS, because according to Islamic Law, as collector they are also eligible to receive some 
part of the zakat paid (approximately 12.5%).   4 
 
The question is, how can this insignificant difference is believed as a good effort 
in reaching equity between muzakkis and non-muzakkis, while a non-muzakki only pays 
Rp 1,000,000 (because she does not have to pay zakat)? It is obvious that, assuming that 
both the muzakki and the non-muzakki have the same value of (social) marginal utility of 
income, genuine equity is reached only if the muzakki and the non-muzakki who have the 
same income ultimately pay the same amount of transfer, regardless the types of the 
transfer, which is Rp 1,000,000.
7 
 
The story would be much different if the government set up the deduction based 
on the assumption that both  muzakki and non-muzakki face the same ex-post value of 
marginal utility of income, or based on the total amount of money that should be paid if a 
muzakki were a non-muzakki. Based on this method, a muzakki should have paid only Rp 
500,000 for income tax since she has already paid Rp 500,000 for zakat.
8  
 
However, it seems that the policymakers have assumed that the marginal utility of 
income of a muzakki (that has the same income as a non-muzzakki) is lower than that of a 
non-muzakki. One obvious explanation for this is that the government would have lesser 
government revenue by basing income tax and  zakat on marginal utility of income 
argument.  
The Behavior of Income Tax and Zakat Payer 
 
Assuming that in a very religious environment there could be some people that 
behave as hypocrites (known as munafiqin in Islam), the appropriate analysis for this 
topic would be a model of tax evasion under uncertainty. A slight modification of income 
tax evasion model developed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) will be used. Instead of 
considering only one type of income tax payer, this model will assume that there are 3 
types of tax payers in Indonesia – and all are muzakkis – A, B, and C. 
 
A is an honest-religious person that always abides by the religious (Islamic) 
teachings, including paying income zakat. She is also a decent tax payer. Hence, there 
will be no need to investigate further about A’s utility maximization since she will obey 
exactly what the government wants her to do. However, she would prefer a situation after 
the Law 17/2000 is implemented because she has more income to spend on other things. 
If previously she pays zakat directly to the mustahiq or to local Masjid Committee, after 
the implementation (to get the deduction) she would go to a certified Zakat Management 
Board. Assuming that the government calculates personal income tax (?) based on after 
zakat Income (YZ=97.5%Yi), person A would choose her actual income (YA = YZ) as the 
basis of the calculation. Hence, the expected utility function of A is  
                                                 
7 Assuming that both muzakki and non-muzakki has the same initial endowment, and the law of diminishing 
marginal utility of income holds. 
8 In other words, in this case only, a muzakki pays 2.5% of her gross income for zakat, and only 5% of her 
net income for income tax, while a non-muzakki pays 10% of her net income for income tax. Hence the 
income tax rate of a muzakki is not fixed, but depends on how much zakat that muzakki has to pay and how 
much income tax of a non-muzakki that has the same income has to pay.   5 
 
E(U)
A =  p U(YZ
A - ?YZ
A)  +  (1-p) U(YZ
A – ?YZ
A) … (1) 
 
where YA is actual income, and p is the probability that the tax payer will be investigated 







A) … (2) 
and  
A A U U 2 1 ? …(3) 
 
where subscript 1 denotes the situation before the implementation of the Law, and 2 
denotes the situation after the implementation of the Law. 
 
B is a person who always pays income zakat because of her religious belief. She 
is a type of person who is afraid of being punished in the hereafter (that is the reason that 
she pays zakat), but does not regard evading income tax as a sin. She does this by directly 
pays the  zakat  to the  mustahiq. If she paid the  zakat through the certified  Zakat 
Management Board, the tax authority could calculate her actual income based on the 
documents from the  Zakat Management Authority.
9  Hence, it is doubtful that the 
implementation of the law could change B’s behavior in paying either income zakat or 
personal income tax. Her utility maximization could be written as 
 
E(U)
B =  p U(YZ
B – ?? YD
B – ?(YZ
B – YD
B))  +  (1-p) U(YZ
B – ?YD
B) … (4) 
 
where ? symbolize some action (punishment) from the government, either by penalty rate 
or jail because of tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). Subscript D denotes 
“declared”. 
 
  C is a “typical income utility maximizer” type – she would choose whatever 
situation that maximizes her income. From the point of view of a Muslim, she is a 
hypocrite. She would evade every transfer she had to pay if she could. She does not really 
care, or is not perfectly informed, about the importance of paying zakat. She would prefer 
to pay only one transfer, which, based on her rationality, is the income tax. This is 
because the government enforces law for tax evader but not the zakat evader. Even after 
the implementation of the law, she would choose to pay the income tax only. By doing 
so, her utility maximization could be written as 
 
E(U)
C =  p U(YD
C – ?? YD
C – ?(YD
C – YD





                                                 
9 In the receipt of  zakat payment from the  Zakat Management Board, the amount of  zakat has to be 
declared. Because B is honest in declaring her income for zakat purpose, she would not declare less than 
her actual income. Hence, the tax authority could compare her income reported to Zakat Management 
Board with that of itself. See Fatima (2000) for detail. 
10 This is exactly the same model as Allingham and Sandmo (1972) with different notations.   6 
  Comparing the three (A, B, and C), before and after the implementation of the 
law, the sequence of the person who gets most money left does not change even though 
the amount could be different between situation 1 (before the implementation) and 
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Therefore, the law does not change the behavior of people who have the same 
characteristics as “B” and “C”. Only people with characteristic like “A” would benefit 
from the implementation of the law. The question is, how many people with “A” 
characteristic in Indonesia? Do they dominate the people? If the answer is “yes”, then the 
implementation of the law would have a positive effect to Indonesian economy. 
However, if the answer is “no” or “ambiguous”, then the implementation of the law 
would have an ambiguous effect to the economy. 
Policy Implication 
 
  Suppose that the number of “B” and “C” type exceeds the number of “A” type of 
people. One way to increase participation rate of people that is categorized as “B”, is that 
the government should encourage people to pay the  zakat to the certified  Zakat 
Management Board. This has to be done through persuasive way, or by giving incentives 
for those who pay  zakat to  Zakat Management Authority.
11 If the latter were done, 
denoting ?  is direct payment of  zakat to mustahiq, ? is payment of zakat to the Zakat 
Management Board, and assuming that transferring the action is costly for B with the cost 




B(?)) – ?(?) = U
B(YZ
B(? )) … (6) 
 
                                                 
11 Theoretically, punishment could also be applied. However in practice, there could be disagreements 
among Muslim clerics in Indonesia, and also in the parliament. Meanwhile, incentives would alter the 
behavior of the type B muzakkis so that they would pay the zakat to Zakat Management Board. However, 
this implies that type B muzakkis now could not make their actual income being differ from their declared 
income to the tax authority. The type of incentives could be ranged from scholarships to visiting Mecca to 
do the Hajj, depends on the agreement of the clerics and Islamic experts.   7 




  Furthermore, to increase the participation of the type C people, one way that 
could be done by the government is setting up rule that zakat is obligatory and there will 
be punishment scheme for those who evade it. Aside from the controversy that could 
surface, the punishment would obviously reduce the number of  zakat evaders and tax 
evaders at the same time. This is because to evade tax, type B and C people declare less 
income than their actual income to the tax authority. However, type C people could still 
do this anyway to reduce the total transfer that they had to pay. Hence, the effective way 
to reduce a significant number of type C people is to put a very hard punishment, such as 
high penalty rate or medium to long term imprisonment.
13 
 
  There are other benefits from setting zakat is obligatory by the government. First, 
there will be coordination between local and provincial Zakat Management Boards. This 
would lead to a more precise disbursement of zakat funds inter-provincially. Second, the 
number of tax evaders could be reduced, if in declaring the income to the  Zakat 
Management Board, there is a religious related statement of declaration so that the 
declarer would be discouraged to be dishonest. Third, the zakat funds could be used to 
fund public goods, such as public schools or even roads in some areas, even though only 
from the collector’s part (12.5%). Iqbal (2000) points out some other economic rationale 
for the (centralized) state collection of zakat. 
 
  Nevertheless, there are obviously administration and/or transaction costs in 
implementing the policy, such as restructuring the Zakat Management Board. This should 
be supported by other laws that give the Zakat Management Board rights to, for example, 
checking a Muslim’s bank accounts. This seems almost impossible to be applied in 
Indonesia
14, due to the potential reluctance from the type “B” or “C” (or in this case only 
– even the type “A”) that could lead to other unproductive activities such as long-term 
protests or strikes. However, the statement from Indonesian Muslim Clerics Board 
(Majelis Ulama Indonesia) could lessen the negative effect. 
 
The other thing that should be taken into consideration is the fact that “small 
collectors” of zakat do exists, especially in rural and remote areas. Transferring the “job” 
to the nearest  Zakat Management Board would imply transferring the revenue from 
collecting the zakat.
15 For those small collectors, the implementation of the policy would 
not be easily accepted. Again in this case, the involvement of Muslim clerics and leaders 
are very important. 
                                                 
12 See footnote 7. 
13 In Malaysia, the penalty rate for violation of zakat laws is different among states. See Ariff (1991, page 
93) for detail. 
14 Because up to this point, even the tax authority has no access to Indonesian’s bank account (except for 
investigation coordinated by the police). 
15 See footnote 6.   8 
Concluding Remarks 
 
  This paper has attempted to discuss the behavior of three different types of people 
due to the implementation of the new law regarding personal income tax in Indonesia. 
The outcome of the implementation of the law is ambiguous, due to (1) the lack of 
information about how honest the tax payer and the  zakat payer in Indonesia in 
conducting their obligation (2) unavailability of complete data regarding zakat collection 
both directly to the  mustahiq and through the  zakat collectors (including the  Zakat 
Management Board). 
 
  There are ways to increase the participation of reluctant people in paying income 
zakat, such as reward and punishment schemes. However, the success of these schemes 
would be subject to support from the laws, and from the Muslim clerics and leaders. 
 
  Aside from the behavior of the zakat and income tax payers, there are also issues 
regarding the behavior of the collectors. Since the collectors are also eligible for some 
parts of the zakat funds, there could be a problem in applying the reward or incentive 
scheme for paying the zakat only to the certified  Zakat Management Board. Small 
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